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INTERNAL AUDIT AT THE HISTORICAL
HUDSON’S BAY COMPANY:
A CHALLENGE TO ACCEPTED HISTORY
Abstract: The accepted history of managerial internal audit is that its
origins are in financial and compliance auditing. Managerial was
added after firms started to expand geographically or into other
businesses. That expansion increased complexity and created problems for managers which the internal auditor assisted in solving
with managerial audits. Contrary to that two stage development,
something comparable to managerial internal audit was being practiced by the Hudson’s Bay Company in the form of inspections as
early as 1871. Rather than in financial and compliance auditing,
these inspections had their geneses in the desire of the senior manager and the committee (board of directors) for additional information on the fur trade and retail operations. This paper will describe
the inspection function at the historical Hudson’s Bay Company, the
circumstances leading to the development of this function, and how
it complemented other controls.

INTRODUCTION
Generally, internal audit is thought to have started with
financial and compliance audits. It arose as the growth and
increasing complexity of firms in the early 20th century
stretched the capabilities of managers and thereby created efficiency and effectiveness problems. By adding managerial activities to financial and compliance, internal audits were recognized as a means of assisting overburdened managers.1 This
two stage history — first of financial and compliance, then of
1
Managerial internal audits are considered to be the same as those described as comprehensive, efficiency and effectiveness, modern, operational,
and value for money.
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managerial internal audit — has been accepted in the literature
on that subject. However, a recent examination of the archives
of the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBCA)2 has suggested that the
two stage history of internal audit may not be universally applicable. Inspections very similar to managerial internal audits
were conducted at the HBC in 1871 — about 50 years prior to
the generally recognized commencement of managerial internal
audits. Moreover, these inspections were introduced by the
HBC at a time when the complexity of the organization was
actually decreasing.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to challenge the
accepted history of internal audit by showing that something
comparable to managerial internal audit had developed earlier
at the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) for reasons different from
those advanced in the conventional history of internal audit.
The next section discusses in greater detail the accepted history
of internal audit. Subsequent sections put forth the background
and the development of inspections at the HBC, respectively.
The inspection function at the HBC is then assessed and compared to managerial internal audit using a contemporary definition. The final section contains the concluding comments.
THE ACCEPTED HISTORY OF INTERNAL AUDIT
Managerial internal audit appears to have been classified as a
20th century management innovation [Flesher, 1977, p. 190;
Brink and Witt, 1982, pp. 5-6]. It has been defined as:
. . . a systematic, objective appraisal by internal auditors of the diverse operations and controls within an
organization to determine whether (1) financial and
operational information is accurate and reliable, (2)
risks to the enterprise are identified and minimized, (3)
external regulations and acceptable internal policies
and procedures are followed, (4) satisfactory standards
are met, (5) resources are used efficiently and economically, and (6) the organization’s objectives are effectively achieved - all for the purpose of assisting
members of the organization in the effective discharge

2
The archive covers the entire company history except for the last 30
years, which are still confidential. Researchers access the 1670 to (approximately) 1914 materials via microfilm which can be borrowed. Most post-1914
materials are restricted in their use because they have not been catalogued and
microfilmed.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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of their responsibilities [Sawyer, 1988, p. 7; Sawyer
and Vinten, 1996, p. 25].
This definition — which “seeks to focus on the broad scope
and objectives of internal auditing and to encapsulate its comprehensive approach” — alludes to the two stages which have
been noted by numerous authors. Generally, the two stages
have been expressed as financial (and compliance) audit followed by the addition of managerial audit. In an article entitled
“Modernization of Internal Audit” Flesher [1977] noted:
. . . the old concept of internal auditing can be compared to a form of insurance. The major objective was
to discover fraud much more quickly than it could be
discovered by a public accountant during an annual
audit. The modern concept of internal auditing is that
of an “arm of management”. No longer is the internal
auditor strictly a policeman, the modern internal auditor is an integral link in the management process [p.
190].
Similarly, in their textbook Modern Internal Auditing: Appraising Operations and Controls, Brink and Witt [1982, pp. 5-6]
recognized two stages to the development of internal audit.
They noted that the earliest concerns of management were
whether: the assets of the organization were being properly protected, company procedures and policies were being complied
with, and the financial records were being accurately maintained. At the same time there were concerns with fraud detection and the coordination of internal auditing with the work of
the external auditor. Brink and Witt also noted that as operations increased in volume and complexity, new pressures were
placed on senior management. To assist managers, internal auditors took on a broader and more management-oriented set of
activities.
Chambers [1980] documented the same shift in the focus of
internal audit by examining The Institute of Internal Auditors’
Statement of Responsibilities of the Internal Auditor, namely:
The 1947 and 1957 editions carried the clause ‘internal
auditing . . . (reviews) accounting, financial and other
operations’ but only the 1947 edition included the
clause ‘internal auditing . . . deals primarily with accounting and financial matters but . . . may also properly deal with matters of an operating nature’. By 1971
both of these clauses had been dropped in favor of
‘Internal auditing . . . (reviews) operations’. So while in
1947 the accent was on financial accounting matters,
Published by eGrove, 2001
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by 1957 there was a balance between these matters and
the audit of other operations (usually called ‘operational auditing’); and by 1971 financial matters were
simply regarded as one of many operations, not meriting special mention [p. 275].
Sawyer [1979] also recognized the importance of The Institute of Internal Auditors in the development of managerial internal audit, namely:
Victor Z. Brink’s recollections of internal auditing
reach back to the beginning of a discipline which I like
to think of as management-oriented internal auditing.
He was there [1941] when it crawled out of the cocoon
of financial ticking and toting and first spread its
wings. The discipline might have had its origin in the
ancient verification of financial transactions, but it
started to mature when Brink and a few others brought
forth The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc. [p. 23].
In one of the few historical studies on internal audit,
Boockholdt [1983] examined the origins of internal audit in
19th century U.S. railways. He attributed the introduction of
financial internal audit to the growth in size and the westward
movement of railways [p.70]. More specifically, as the railway
companies began to conduct large-scale financial transactions
at widely dispersed geographical locations in the 1840s, they
appointed internal auditors to monitor the processing of financial transactions. In the U.K., Pollins [1957] reproduced a letter
of 1867 from the external auditors to the shareholders to reveal
the internal audit activities at the London & North Western
Railway. The letter stated:
That the main check, as between the Board and its
numerous servants, devolves of course on the large establishment at Euston called the Audit Office, headed
by a responsible Officer, who has eight in-door assistants, seven out-door inspectors, and a staff of 127
clerks. . . . The verification made by the Auditors, assisted by the Public Accountants, is therefore as between the Board and the Shareholders — its object
being to ensure that the Books are kept upon correct
principles, that the published accounts are in accordance therewith, and that they honestly lay bare to the
proprietors the true condition of the undertaking [pp.
16-17].
The letter indicated that the “Audit Office” was involved
with auditing payment vouchers, debenture registers, stock and
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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share registers, dividend accounts, cash balances, station revenues, and rents due. The focus was financial and not managerial.
Managerial internal audit did not gain much recognition
until the establishment of The Institute of Internal Auditors in
1941. It has been accepted that in the early 20th century many
American firms expanded their operations in terms of geography, product lines, and functions — that is, they became vertically integrated — which led to large and complex organizations that were difficult to manage. Chandler [1962, pp. 9-11]
noted that to make these firms more manageable, a decentralized structure was implemented with the following components: (1) a general office at the top (with general executives
and staff specialists) which coordinated, appraised, and
planned goals and policies and allocated resources for a number of quasi-autonomous, fairly self contained divisions; and (2)
divisions for carrying out the strategic decisions of the general
office. The divisions consisted of: (a) a central office that administered a number of departments, each with functional responsibilities such as manufacturing and selling; (b) department headquarters which in turn coordinated, appraised, and
planned for a number of field units; and (c) field units which
were responsible for plants and sales offices.
As part of the appraisal function at these complex early
20th century firms, it was inferred by Williamson [1975] that
the general offices of these firms (which were described by
Chandler [1962]), sent internal auditors to the divisions to assess financial and operational controls. Internal audit was an
integral and complementary part of the control systems which
consisted of strategies, plans, and budgets (as ex ante controls)
and operating statements, return on investment calculations,
and various operating reports (as ex post controls). As the general office executives were isolated from the divisions, internal
audit was important for validating the divisional performance
contained in abstract financial reports [Williamson, 1975, pp.
146-148]. More specifically, Williamson [1975] suggested that
the internal audit function produced information not available
to open-market transactions:
The auditing advantage of internal organization in
relation to interfirm organization is attributable to
constitutional and incentive differences which operate
in favor of the internal mode. An external auditor is
typically constrained to review written records and
documents and in other respects restrict the scope of
Published by eGrove, 2001
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his investigation to clearly pertinent matters. An internal auditor, by contrast, has greater freedom of action,
both to include less formal evidence and to explore the
byways into which his investigation leads [pp. 29-30].
Penno [1991, p. 521] adds an important proviso for maintaining internal audit objectivity. Penno demonstrates that to
be objective the internal audit unit must report to a sufficiently
high level in the organizational hierarchy. With the internal
audit unit reporting to a low level in the hierarchy, there would
be a tendency for biasing in favor of the manager overseeing
the internal audit unit. Reporting to the chief executive officer
and/or the audit committee of the board leads to fewer biases
and more objective findings.
It was noted that The Institute of Internal Auditors had a
significant effect on the development of managerial internal
audit. Thus, the recent change in its definition of internal audit
is likely to be significant [Krogstad et al., 1999]. Its previous
definition and the new definition are contained in Exhibit 1.
Although this is the profession’s definition, and likely selfserving, it is based on extensive surveys of practice. The new
definition could be ushering in a third stage of internal auditing, but at present it is too early to substantiate this. The striking difference is that the previous definition sees internal audit
as an appraisal function within the organization, whereas the
new definition sees internal audit as concerned with assurance
and consulting services. The previous definition presupposed
that internal auditors examined and evaluated activities. The
new definition gives internal auditors the general responsibility
for adding value by improving an organization’s activities. The
previous definition had auditors assisting members of the organization in the discharge their responsibilities; the new definition is more general in helping the organization accomplish its
objectives. With the previous definition, internal auditors provided analyses, appraisals, recommendations, and information
about activities. The new definition has internal auditors bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluating and improving the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes [Professional Guidance, 2000].
To summarize, the previous definition or what has been
called managerial internal audit assumed that internal audit
was an extension of management. This was a necessary role as
financial information was incomplete for effective management. The new definition has internal auditors as partners
with senior management in developing systems. Financial
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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EXHIBIT 1
Internal Auditing Defined
The Institute of Internal Auditors’ Definitions of Internal Audit
Previous Definition. Internal auditing is an independent appraisal function established within an organization to examine and evaluate its activities as a service to the organization. The objective of internal auditing is
to assist members of the organization in the effective discharge of their
responsibilities. To this end, internal auditing furnishes them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations, counsel, and information concerning
the activities reviewed. The audit objective includes promoting the effective control at reasonable cost.
New Definition. Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance
and consulting activity designed to add value and improve an
organization’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes.
Source: Krogstad et al. [1999, p.29]

information may still be incomplete, but with low cost computing and enterprise resource planning systems (such as SAP and
PeopleSoft), managers have many other sources of information
at their disposal to address that incompleteness. Consequently,
internal audit as a profession is being forced to find a new
mandate.
This section has noted that the accepted history of internal
audit has exhibited an interaction between the need for internal
audit by organizations and the provision of internal audit by
the profession. With that context, the paper will now explain
the background to inspections and their development at the
HBC, both of which predate the internal audit profession.
BACKGROUND TO THE INSPECTIONS
The HBC, the oldest commercial organization in the world
that continues in its original line of business [Milgrom and
Roberts, 1992, p. 6], was established by the King of England in
1670. Immediately upon being granted a charter, the HBC located posts at the mouths of rivers flowing into the Hudson
Bay, in the northeast part of North America. The HBC was
successful in pursuing a strategy of waiting at bayside posts for
the aborigines to come down those rivers annually to barter
their furs for European goods. Competition later emerged from
“pedlars” who were willing to go inland from Montreal to the
Published by eGrove, 2001
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south and west of the Hudson Bay to save the aborigines long
and arduous trips. To meet this competition the HBC, in 1774,
established its first inland post. This was followed by many
other posts in the next decades until the strategy of its trade
changed from bayside to inland posts.
In pursuing the inland trade strategy, the HBC was competing with various trading partnerships from Montreal who eventually joined together to form the North West Company (NWC).
The competition was described as peaceful coexistence [Carlos,
1981, pp. 778-781]. There was no collusion, and predatory competition did not occur until 1816 [Carlos, 1982, pp. 176-181].
Then in 1821, with both companies suffering, the HBC merged
with the NWC, retaining the HBC name [ibid., 1982, pp. 180181]. After the merger, George Simpson was put in charge of
the Northern Department, while William Williams was responsible for the other, smaller Southern Department. In a few
years, Governor Simpson was responsible for all North American operations, a responsibility he retained until his death in
1860.
Management was challenged during this period because of
three types of uncertainty: (1) inland travel on rivers and lakes,
(2) trade conditions, and (3) “living off the land”. These categories related to major groupings of parts, activities or means-end
chains in the fur-trade operation.
Inland travel activities were particularly complicated. Ships
from London had to be unloaded and the trade goods and supplies stored in warehouses at the ports or directly loaded into
canoes and boats for shipment to posts. The trips took weeks or
months, and for each day there were demanding tasks in order
to maneuver man-powered canoes or boats along rocky-bottomed rivers and lakes. These trips often required portages or
the carrying of the canoes, boats, and their contents around
rapids or waterfalls, or from one water system to another. Portages were physically demanding on the men. In short, inland
travel was problematic for three important reasons. First, all
employee actions were unobservable. Consequently, effort and
diligence were not always explicitly known. Second, employees
were subject to opportunistic behavior. They were not always
willing to give priority to the HBC’s interests. For example,
after 1774 when competition forced the HBC to move inland,
employees exerted all forms of effort in their resistance to go
inland [Burley, 1993, p. 5]. One of HBC inland governors noted
in 1820 “that there is a great want of subordination in general
amongst the people” [transcribed by Rich, 1938, p. 51]. Third,
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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there was environmental uncertainty from random events. The
arrival times at various posts could not be predicted as weather
and environmental factors interfered with schedules. Moreover,
the exact distances and best water routes between posts were
uncertain.
Trade conditions were uncertain because of the lack of a
monetary system. A large number of furs were traded for an
even larger number of European trade goods. Prior to the move
inland, North American aborigines had developed a system of
middlemen for transporting furs to bayside posts. The distant
aborigines who did the trapping would often trade with those
who made the trip [Innis, 1970, pp. 137-139]. However, this
system of middlemen started to unravel when the HBC moved
inland and dealt directly with aboriginal trappers. Trade was
further complicated by the larger number of different aboriginal groups with different languages and customs. Moreover, the
behaviors of traders were not observable, and thus it could not
be ensured that they acted in the best interests of the HBC.
There was no infrastructure inland, and in contrast to posts
located on the Bay, all food and clothing requirements could
not be sent from London because of high inland transportation
costs. To pursue inland trade, living off the land was necessary,
but highly uncertain. Food and clothing had to be supplied
locally at dozens of posts either by HBC employees or through
trade. Hunting, fishing, and farming were also pursued, subject
to transformation uncertainty as employee behavior could not
be observed. Weather was always crucial for these primary activities, but it varied significantly according to seasonal conditions and geographical location. Hunting and fishing were precarious because of the unpredictable migration patterns of
prey. In addition, the short growing seasons and infertile soils
(especially at some northern posts) yielded poor and uncertain
crops.
To manage the North American fur trade operation in the
face of this extreme uncertainty, Simpson fully implemented
and improved upon the accounting and control practices introduced by the committee of the HBC (comparable to a modernday board of directors). These practices were described by the
committee as “a Radical Change in the System of Carrying on
the Trade” [HBCA, reels 6 and 39]. Although the inland trade
strategy commenced in 1774, the accounting and controls did
not reflect the new strategy until 1810 when profitability problems, aggravated by external factors, incited radical change
[Spraakman, 2000, pp. 12-13].
Published by eGrove, 2001
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The accounting and control practices perfected by Simpson
in the 1820s can be described as mechanisms for directing and
monitoring operations [Roy and Spraakman, 1996, pp. 64-69].
The five mechanisms for directing operations – organizational
structure, outfits, indents, councils, and standards – will be
briefly examined in turn. The monitoring mechanisms will be
discussed thereafter. First, the organizational structure of the
HBC was hierarchical with the shareholders electing a committee of seven members plus the London-based governor and
deputy governor. The committee appointed the inland governors. For the North American operation, individual trading
posts in the same vicinity were grouped into districts for managing. In turn, districts were placed geographically into departments. The departments were headed by governors, as noted,
while districts were generally headed by chief factors; posts
were generally directed by chief traders, while the smaller posts
were the responsibility of clerks. Second, the HBC trade practices centered on the annual outfit. Trade goods and supplies
comprising the outfit were sent from London at the beginning
of the outfit year. Third, an indent or list of trade goods and
supplies requested for the next outfit was sent to the committee
in London. The HBC used a series of indents to plan and coordinate the movement of trade goods and supplies over a two or
three-year cycle. Fourth, departmental chief factors met annually at convenient locations with the inland governor, and perhaps some chief traders, to interpret instructions from the committee and to establish rules and regulations for the conduct of
the business. With communications and transportation being
slow and expensive, these councils were important for establishing direction and for achieving coordination. Fifth, given
the existence of a barter system there was a standard of trade
which each post developed to ensure that the furs received
would cover all costs and generate a profit. The standards of
trade related all furs and all trade goods with a prime beaver
pelt (designated a “made beaver”). These standards provided
explicit instructions on the furs to be obtained for each trade
good as well as for an entire outfit.
The six monitoring mechanisms were: inventory records,
accounting records, journals, operational data, councils, and
the annual review of operations [Roy and Spraakman, 1996, pp.
69-74]. First, inventory records were detailed and kept for all
trade goods and supplies in monetary and physical terms with
reference to the actual post or depot location. In movement
from port to depot to post considerable effort was devoted to
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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tracking inventory with packing slips, invoices, and other
records. Second, accounting records furnished the committee
in London with the cost of furs from each district. This district
record was a “balance sheet” which was actually a ledger account and part of the debit and credit bookkeeping system.
Specifically, it was a means of closing the district books at the
end of the outfit year, and thus a culmination of the year’s
activities for the district and its posts. With the scale of prices
(a list of recent market prices for furs provided by the committee), the profit (or loss) of the district could be estimated prior
to the actual sale of furs. The balance sheet contained the following (abbreviated) debit and credit items:
Debits
Beginning inventory
Shipments received
Servant wages
Profit (if one)
Total debits

Credits
Inventory supplied to other districts
Servant debts, and advances
Sale value of furs (based on the scale
of prices)
Loss (if one)
Total credits.

Third, journals — the narrative records of daily occurrences — were maintained by the senior employee at each post.
The journals recorded what work was done by employees each
day, the names of aborigines coming to trade, the arrival of the
outfit and shipments of the furs [HBCA, reels 1M116 and
3M224]. The purpose was to provide the committee with a “better understanding” of the activities at posts. Fourth, during
Simpson’s governorship operational data were important. Distances and load weights were recorded with the intent of improving efficiencies. Fifth, at the annual council meetings the
governor and chief factors reviewed the performance of posts
and shared operational information. Sixth, Simpson gathered
information about operations during his legendary visits to
posts. During all but three of the thirty-nine years he spent in
charge of the fur trade, Simpson crossed the North American
continent [Newman, 1987, p.304]. These visits provided important sources of information for his annual reports to the committee. The actual performance of each post, and district, was
compared to that expected for the year, expected for future
years, and achieved in past years.
In summary, during the period from 1821 to 1860 the directing and monitoring mechanisms of the HBC emphasized
operational planning. If there was a single description of the
approach to the HBC’s management during that period, it
Published by eGrove, 2001
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would be “getting the inventory to the right place at the right
time for profitable trade”.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSPECTIONS
After Simpson’s death in 1860, the annual tours were maintained to a lesser extent by his successors. This was due in part
to Simpson’s successors Dallas (1860 to 1864) and Mactavish
(1864 to 1870) being less rigorous in their scrutiny and inspection of fur posts [MacKay, 1936, p. 284]. They did not have his
extraordinary energy. This reduction in ex post control, plus
increased competition because of the modernization of transportation, soon resulted in operational problems. These were
discussed in a report dated 1871 by Cyril Graham, who had
been hired by the committee to examine the fur trade, the relations between the company and its officers, and general business prospects [HBCA, reel 733]. As a partial solution to the
operational problems in the fur trade, inspections were formally established in 1871 with the creation of four inspecting
chief factor positions [HBCA, reel 526]. Their duties included
visiting posts and districts, examining the books, reporting on
the condition of facilities, evaluating personnel, and making
recommendations for improvements [Ray, 1990, p.15]. At the
same time, the structure of chief factors and chief traders reporting to the commissioner (the new title for the inland governor) was expanded by two more positions. The managers subordinate to the commissioner now included, in descending
order: inspecting chief factor, chief factor, factor, chief trader,
and junior chief trader [HBCA, reel 3M232].
Initially the inspecting chief factors had line authority over
districts and reported to the commissioner on fur trading posts
and districts, and, later as they were opened, on the retail
saleshops. As they were more senior than any of the post or
district managers whose operations were being inspected, the
inspecting chief factors were regarded as authority threats
[Ray, 1990, p. 71]. Later, the title was changed to inspecting
officers with the elimination of their authority over post,
saleshop, and district managers. In a memorandum to the committee in 1888 the commissioner described the differences between two positions:
I would call attention to the difference between an inspecting chief factor and the present inspecting officers. The inspecting chief factor used to go into a district clothed with authority and as the senior of the
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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officer in charge. This undoubtedly had the effect of
undermining the authority of the officer in charge of
the district, the maintenance of which I believe to be
vital. At present the inspecting officers, bearing no additional rank in virtue of their office as Inspectors, visit
the district or post and in no way interfere with authority of the officer in charge. Their duty is to report to
the commissioner and for the commissioner to take
actions. The difference between action being taken by
the commissioner or by the inspecting officers being
very great in the eyes of the officers. In the one case
there is hearty concurrence and in the other suspicion
and jealousy [HBCA, reel 745].
The responsibilities (or scheme) of the inspecting officers
as at 1886, which are presented in Exhibit 2, are strikingly
similar to the duties of modern-day managerial internal auditors. This list of responsibilities was attached to the aforementioned memorandum from the commissioner to the committee
[HBCA, reel 3M224]. Moreover, virtually the same checklist was
used with inspections for the next three decades. The emphasis
of inspections was neither financial nor compliance as expected
by the accepted internal audit history. Instead the initial emphasis was on managerial auditing. There were two reasons for
this. First, the persons completing the inspections were seasoned managers. Second, the financial component was relatively small; of the eight sections to the scheme, only one dealt
with the accounts. Moreover, even the accounting section was
approached from a managerial perspective. For example, a typical inspector made the following observations in the first decade of the 20th century:
The acting manager is . . . weak in collections, and
showing a want of discrimination in granting credit . . .
Too long credit is given. Taken generally the accounts
are unsatisfactory, and the collection of them will require immediate attention, while great caution in
granting further credit will require to be exercised
[HBCA, reel 525].
The other seven sections of the scheme dealt with responsibilities of the manager in charge, such as buildings, stock, and
furs. In addition, the tone was managerial. For example, in the
“General” section, points one and two read, “can trade of post
be improved”, and “can additional posts be opened or present
closed with advantage”, respectively.
It is important to note that inspectors were being introPublished by eGrove, 2001
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EXHIBIT 2
Scheme for Inspections, 1886
a. Buildings
1. condition.
2. situation.
3. suitability.
b. Stock
1. verification of inventory.
2. suitability.
3. sufficiency.
4. condition.
5. time of turn-over.
6. saleable stock (list attached) with suggestion for disposal.
7. live stock.
c. Furs
1. quality.
2. is post obtaining full portion of best skins.
3. is the trade affected by tariff.
4. increase or decrease of fur-bearing animals.
d. Accounts
1. cash book.
2. examination and classification of outstanding balances (with list
attached and marginal notes). Is each account current, if not, is
debtor a regular customer.
3. verification of debts.
4. securities (with list attached and remarks).
5. capital employed. How often turned over.
6. percentage of apparent gain to capital.
7. audit.
e. Expenses
1. mess expenses or commutation.
2. gratuities to servants and [aborigines].
3. miscellaneous expenses.
4. possibility of reduction of expenses.
5. transport and cost-landed.
f. Personal
1. business capability, suitability and personal character of all attached to post.
g. General
1. can trade of post be improved.
2. can additional posts be opened or present closed with advantage.
3. opposition.
4. division of territory.
5. route of goods and return.
6. remarks on general character of business with anything met under
preceding heads.
7. conditions of [aborigines].
8. list of outposts.
9. when last visited by officer in charge of district.
h. Suggestions
Source: HBCA [reel 3M224].
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duced while the HBC was becoming easier to manage because
of improvements in communications and transportation instigated by the coming of steamboats, railroads, and the telegraph. The HBC went along with this modernization which,
after 1860, gradually reduced the three forms of uncertainty
which impacted on its operations. First, inland travel by birch
bark canoe and crude boat was replaced by more predictable
and less expensive steamboat and railway transportation. Second, the HBC no longer had to provide food and clothing for its
employees as an infrastructure developed across western
Canada for those purposes. Third, a monetary system replaced
bartering.
Modernization caused the HBC to be a simpler business to
manage, and led to changes in the way it directed and monitored its operations [Spraakman and Davidson, 1998, pp. 8393]. First, with a relatively simple business (despite expansion
into retail saleshops), the HBC evolved to a flatter and more
centralized structure with the commissioner firmly in charge.
The department level was eliminated and districts were streamlined through the consolidation of posts. Communications and
transportation improvements allowed the commissioner to be
more directly involved in the affairs of the less uncomplicated
posts and saleshops. Consequently, the number of managers
(chief factors and chief traders) declined. In 1887, the commissioner gave as the reason for this decline, “the requirements of
the service would be met by a smaller number of officers than
at present hold commissions” [HBCA, reel 3M232].
Second, with better communications and transportation,
and the development of local Canadian and American suppliers,
the HBC was no longer dependent on the annual outfits from
London. Third and relatedly, indents became less important
because it was unnecessary to plan months or years in advance
for trade goods and supplies. Ordering could be done from local
or North American suppliers as needed, or just before needed.
Indents were used primarily for ordering items from England,
which was a decreasing portion of the total order of trade goods
and supplies [HBCA, reels 3M230, 3M232]. Fourth, improvements in communications and transportation made councils
unnecessary as the commissioner could easily contact posts or
saleshops to coordinate the shipment of trade goods, supplies
and furs, assign employees, and introduce rules and regulations. Fifth, the standard of trade was no longer needed as
market prices existed for furs and trade goods.
Monitoring mechanisms also changed. First, with inventory
Published by eGrove, 2001
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more readily available and the one to two year wait no longer
necessary, the importance of inventory decreased along with
the importance placed on inventory records. Second, the financial records underwent dramatic changes. Instead of showing
debits on one side and credits on the other with profit (debit) or
loss (credit) as the balancing item, the balance sheet evolved
into the trading account with the following line items in descending order: sales, direct costs, gross margin, expenses, and
apparent gain. The HBC used these trading accounts to manage
posts and saleshops as to their capital employed and their return on capital employed [HBCA, reel 508].
There was another related change to the accounting
records. The commissioner in 1891 proposed to change the accounting from outfit to fiscal year end [HBCA, reel 508]. When
using outfit years, the books were not closed until after the sale
of all furs in London, which was one year or longer after the
May 31 year end. This also meant that the district accounting
reports had to be completed at the London office. The resulting
accounting system was complicated and expensive. However,
more frequent sales led to annual reporting which also allowed
the district accounting reports to be completed in Winnipeg;
this gave the commissioner more frequent information which
allowed for decision making to be more centralized with him.
Third, operational data became less important for two reasons: financial information became more important, and the
councils were discontinued, thereby eliminating the opportunity to discuss operational data. Fourth, posts, saleshops, and
districts continued to prepare annual reports, which tended to
be explanations of financial statement line items and responses
to inspector reports, rather than assessments of operations. The
in-depth discussions that the committee had in their annual
letters to posts were replaced with discussions of inspection
reports. Relatedly, the annual reports submitted by the commissioner became largely discussions of operating statement line
items. Fifth, the number and frequency of council meetings
declined after 1860; the last took place in 1887. There was a
marked decline in the sharing of information and experience.
Sixth, journals were still prepared, but reviewed less frequently.
There were fewer managers to review the journals.
In summary, a new system of management developed during the period 1860 to 1914. It can be best described as
management by numbers. The structure was flattened and authority was centralized. Indents, outfits, inventory records, operational data, and standards were de-emphasized. Councils
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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were discontinued as the commissioner did not need them for
directing or coordinating purposes. Instead of elaborate ex ante
and ex post management mechanisms, the system was simplified. The commissioner directed the posts and saleshops with
simple indents and outfits, and fewer standards, but with explicit feedback. The feedback came in two parts. The main
source was detailed post and saleshop trading accounts, which
included the capital employed and the return on capital employed. In addition, the HBC employed inspecting officers to
regularly visit posts and saleshops in order to report to the
commissioner on operations.
AN ASSESSMENT OF INSPECTIONS
Sawyer’s [1988, p. 7] and Sawyer and Vinten’s [1996, p. 25]
definition of managerial internal audit, discussed in the second
section of this paper, is now used to assess the HBC’s inspections from 1871 to 1914. More specifically, this definition provides seven criteria for assessing the inspections.
(1) Systematic and objective appraisal. Inspectors only proceeded to posts or saleshops when requested by the commissioner [HBCA, reel 745]. Their duties were to give complete
reports to the commissioner using for fur posts the eight (“a” to
“h”) headings in the scheme (in Exhibit 2), carefully separating
facts from opinions or suggestions. Sections “a” to “g” dealt
with factual conditions, while section “h” contained the “suggestions”. For efficiency, inspectors used pre-printed forms that
allowed them to write the number (e.g., item 1 from section a)
rather than the actual description (for example, for item 1 in
section a, buildings, the sub-description was “condition”) with
their assessments.
The inspection steps were established a priori with concern
for a systematic process. Inspection reports were shared with
the person in charge of the post or saleshop, and then sent to
the more senior managers. For the fur posts, district managers
made recommendations for remedying shortcomings, to which
the commissioner added his own recommendations in a letter
attached to the copy of the inspection report sent to the committee. An example is the commissioner’s letter of 1893 discussing the inspections of the Athabasca and McKenzie River districts [HBCA, reel 820]. The accompanying ten-page letter to
the two district managers contained inspection summaries for
the district office and fourteen posts, plus a comparative statePublished by eGrove, 2001
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ment of aboriginal debts which were problematic at some of
the posts. Judging by their comments in return letters, the committee carefully read the commissioner’s letters discussing inspection reports as well as the actual inspection reports [e.g.,
HBCA, reels 3M177 and 3M178].
Similarly, the saleshop inspection reports were discussed
with the managers in charge [HBCA, reels 859, 860, 863]. These
reports were also submitted to the commissioner, who in a
letter to the committee, explained how the identified shortcomings would be remedied. These letters and copies of the reports
were then sent to the committee, which subsequently responded to the commissioner in terms of directions, or requests
for more information.
To ensure knowledgeable appraisals, inspectors tended to
be experienced post or district managers. However, there was a
recognition that an inspector could not “independently” inspect
posts under his own responsibility. Therefore, the inspectors
tended to inspect posts for which they had no responsibility.
Often, two inspectors were assigned to work together. One recommended combination was “an old fur trade officer such as
Mr. Hardisty . . . [and] . . . Mr. Beaton who is an accountant and
acquainted with the modern system of trading” [HBCA, reel
745].
The inspectors reported to the commissioner. In a letter to
the committee in 1907, the commissioner described the inspection staff as consisting of three positions: a chief inspecting
officer, an inspector of fur trade posts, and an inspector of
saleshops [HBCA, reel 842]. The skill set of inspectors was described by the commissioner in recommending an employee for
the job of fur post inspector:
Mr. Tremayne’s experience in various departments of
the Company’s service has been such as to give him a
good general knowledge of detail, and while in charge
of Lake Superior District he has shown himself to be
economical and discretionary in his methods. That district, in view of the keen competition obtaining, has
been a good training ground, and the knowledge of
transportation matters acquired there and previously
in British Columbia district are of value in the work
which it is proposed to assign him. . . . On the other
hand he is young and vigorous for traveling, and it is
believed his visits to fur trade posts and districts would
have a healthy influence, while his knowledge of general detail would render his services useful in the department when not so engaged [ibid.].
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4
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(2) Accuracy and reliability of information. Inspectors were concerned with the care with which the post books were maintained. Accurate and reliable books for trade goods, supplies,
credit to aborigines, and fur inventories were deemed fundamental to the success of the Company.
(3) Risk identified and minimized. By approaching their work
from the perspective of what was best for the Company, the
inspectors identified issues regarding competition, fur availability, and other matters that would have a negative impact, and
warned the commissioner.
(4) External regulations and acceptable internal practices. There
were minimal external regulations for the HBC. However, the
HBC had documented “Rules and Regulations” specifying the
desired practices for both the fur posts [HBCA, reel 3M224] and
the saleshops [HBCA, reel 863]. The committee and commissioner were explicit that the rules and regulations should be
followed. Inspectors used these rules and regulations as a
checklist for judging actual practices.
(5) Satisfactory standards are met. In addition to being used by
the inspectors as a basis for judging actual practices, the rules
and regulations noted above were used as the basis for expectations or standards. For example, item 42 in the 1887 “Rules and
Regulations” specified that, “officers of districts shall visit all
posts within their districts at least once a year” [HBCA, reel
3M224]. This was typical of the rules and regulations. The acceptable practice was for the officer in charge to visit the posts;
the standard was that the visits must occur once a year.
(6) Resources are used efficiently and economically. The headings in Exhibit 2 were essentially a list of the resources used by
a post. Moreover, fur posts and saleshops were allocated capital
and evaluated with return on capital employed. Often inspectors did the return on capital employed calculations for the
posts and saleshops, and made suggestions to improve profitability. In regard to the use of resources, the commissioner
described the inspections as a means of exerting efficient control over operations [HBCA, reel 967]. Inspectors were also
used in conjunction with the reorganization of districts and
posts to systematically reduce expenses [HBCA, reels 820 and
821].
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(7) The organization’s objectives are effectively achieved. As a
shareholder-owned, profit pursuing organization, the HBC’s objectives emphasized the pursuit of profits and cost reductions.
Inspections reflected these objectives. Inspectors were used
when the commissioner and/or committee were contemplating
structural changes, or when they had concerns about the profitability of a saleshop, post, or district.
A review of the actual inspection reports revealed that the
managerial emphasis was blatant. The 1886 inspection reports
for the Cumberland district provided examples [HBCA, reel
3M224]. The seven posts in the district were inspected, and a
report on each was prepared and submitted to the commissioner. Each item from the scheme in Exhibit 2 was addressed,
with the last section (h), containing suggestions for improvements which were cross referenced with earlier findings. Not
every finding of deficiency led to a suggestion. The five suggestions for the Grand Rapids post are shown in Exhibit 3.
EXHIBIT 3
Suggestions by Inspecting Officers, 1886
1.

Building at west-end of Portage should be maintained in case of opposition or any change in the Trade. It is stated that no Patent has been
issued, but the Company’s location should be secured. The ownership
of the W. & WT. Co. is not known, it would do well to have this
explained in case of emergency and to avoid trouble.

2

The exact cost landed of goods should be ascertained. Mr. McLean [the
person in charge of the post] should make his own requisition (subject
to the approval of the Officer in Charge) according to what he has in
stock and the requirements of his trade; and after taking Inventory.

3.

A Cash Book should be kept as well as an account of all expenses. The
Profit of the Post should be ascertained at Cumberland. Mr. McLean
appears to be anxious to be judged by results, of which at present he is
ignorant.

4.

An attempt might be made to increase the Fur Trade by giving assistance to Mr. McLean during the Winter - He being alone cannot look
after it. Judiciously giving small debts to Fur Hunters in the early
autumn might also help to increase the Returns especially if sufficient
leather were at the Post.

5.

The overstock should be struck off the Requisition at Cumberland. A
list has been furnished to the Officer in Charge.

Source: HBCA [reel 3M224].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol28/iss1/4

20

Spraakman: Internal audit at the historical Hudson's Bay Company: A challenge to accepted history
Spraakman: Internal Audit at the Hudson’s Bay Company

39

Another example of the managerial orientation of the inspection reports was revealed in a letter from the commissioner
to the committee in 1899 [HBCA, reel 820]. The topic of the
letter was the reorganization of five fur trade districts and their
nineteen posts. In order to have an effective reorganization, the
inspecting officer was asked by the commissioner to address
questions relating to the amalgamation of districts with a view
to more economical management; purchasing of furs and the
use of valuation tariffs; aboriginal debts; and cash and trading
tariffs. The inspecting officer’s answers to the four questions
were developed from an inspection of each post with similar
criteria to that in Exhibit 2. Resulting reports were summarized
into twenty pages of notes which were sent by the commissioner to the committee along with a typed letter from the inspecting officer to the commissioner with detailed, quantified
answers to the four questions.
The HBC differentiated between inspectors and auditors.
Inspectors were employees; auditors were not. Auditors verified
the accuracy of accounts [HBCA, reel 822]. Part-time auditors
were used from the late 1880s until 1911 to verify certain accounts [HBCA, reel 813]. The auditor at the Winnipeg office
was the manager for the local Bank of Montreal branch, the
HBC’s bank. His duties in relation to the HBC were to verify the
cash transactions, month-end statements, and inventories. The
HBC also used the managers or the accountants at the Bank of
Montreal branches in Vancouver, Victoria, and Montreal to
verify account balances. These auditors reported to the committee in London and their duties were coordinated with the London auditor. In 1911 Marwick Mitchell & Co., a Scottish chartered accounting firm with offices in numerous U.S. cities as
well as Montreal and Winnipeg, was hired to replace the parttime auditors. The HBC’s London auditor had been employed
by the committee from 1866 to “audit” the balance sheet and
related financial statements [HBCA, reels 19 and 508].
This assessment of the HBC’s inspection activities from
1871 to 1914 suggests that the inspections were comparable to
modern definitions managerial internal audits.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Inspections were an integral part of the management of the
HBC from 1871 until at least 1914. They were managerial in
orientation, and as such they were an extension of the commissioner who did not have the time to visit and inspect posts and
Published by eGrove, 2001

21

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 28 [2001], Iss. 1, Art. 4
40

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2001

saleshops. Inspections were undertaken through the use of a
checklist, specified by the commissioner. Financial inspection
was included, but as a very secondary focus. More importantly,
inspections by examining operating matters provided an alternative assessment to the financial trading accounts on how well
the posts and saleshops were actually performing.
Although the development of the inspection function at the
HBC appeared to be an isolated phenomenon, its genesis was
not. Inspections had a comparable genesis to the development
of managerial internal audits in early 20th century organizations described by Chandler [1962] and Williamson [1975]. The
commonality was not complexity. The HBC was becoming less
complex while Chandler [1962] and Williamson [1975] were
dealing with increased complexity. The commonality — the use
of abstract financial accounting data — meant that information
on actual operations was needed for effective understanding.
Thus, the inspection function was developed to compensate for
the incompleteness of financial accounting information. If the
commissioner could have observed his post and saleshop managers, he might not have needed inspectors. Alternatively, if the
commissioner had continued to use the directing and monitoring mechanisms from the 1820 to 1860 (or Simpson) period, he
might not have needed inspectors. However, by eliminating or
de-emphasizing most of those directing and monitoring mechanisms in favor of instructing posts and saleshops directly with
improved communications and with highly abstract trading accounts, the commissioner was required to use inspectors to
truly understand the posts and saleshops. For a firm such as the
HBC concerned with profits, activities had to be closely managed and controlled in order to maximize income generation.
In conclusion, the HBC inspections were developed not as a
response to complexity as predicted by the accepted history of
internal audit, but to compensate for the abstractness of the
financial accounting data. Inspections, in other words, compensated for the low information content of the financial trading
accounts. The research question that begs to be asked is, How
did other organizations adjust to abstract financial accounting
data? Was managerial internal audit evoked, or to compensate
for the lack of information content were other controls introduced or expanded?
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